I. Introduction
Prior research has provided useful insights into the structure of compensation plans and their incentive effects.^ However, one important limitation of these studies is the virtual absence of any cross-sectional analyses of the attributes of compensation contracts.^ This absence is related, in part, to the problems associated with controlling for "other factors" that affect compensation. That is, compensation contracts are thought to be functions of characteristics of the manager, the firm, and the environment.^ In our attempt to address some of these complexities, we employ an analjrtical agency theory model to provide a structure for controlling for "other factors" in order to examine the "informational properties" of accounting and market measures of performance.
More specifically, we exploit the results of Holmstrom [1979] and others which suggest that the relative weight placed on a performance measure in a compensation contract is an increasing function of its "signal-to-noise" ratio with respect to the agent's actions. Using this framework, we empirically examine whether the relative use of security market and accounting measures of performance in executive compensation is related to the amount of "noise" inherent in the two signals and the "sensitivity" of these two signals to managerial actions. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms place relatively more weight on market performance (and less weight on accounting performance) in compensation contracts for situations in which (i) the variance of the accounting measure of performance is high relative to the variance of the market measure of performance, {ii) the firm is experiencing high growth rates in assets and sales, and (iii) the value of the manager's personal holdings of his firm's stock is low.
Section 2 provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the use of performance measures in compensation contracts. The sample selection procedures are discussed in section 3. In section 4, we discuss the measurement of the performance variables and managerial compensation and present the results of an analysis of the time-series relation between cash compensation and accounting and market performance. In section 5, we develop a number of hypotheses regarding the informational properties of accounting and market measures of performance. In section 6, we examine whether the cross-seetional variation in the relative weights placed on security market versus accounting performance in compensation contracts is related to the signal-to-noise ratios of these performance variables. The research results are summarized in section 7.
Theoretical Framework
Although agency theory does not provide insights into the use of accounting or market numbers as specific measures of performance in In contrast, many studies implicitly treat the compensation contract as if it were exogenous. For example, one line of research has examined whether the contracts (either cross-sectional differences in contracts or time-series changes in contracts) are associated with managerial decision making (e.g., Larcker [1983] and Healy [1985] ). Unfortunately, it is unclear whether it is appropriate to attribute any association between the adoption of a contract and changes in managerial decisions to (i) the contractual change or (ii) other variables which are the causal determinants of the contractual change. This criticism also applies to studies which have examined the security market reaction to compensation contract changes (e.g., Lambert and Larcker [1985a; 19856] and Brickley, Bhagat, and Lease [1985] ). compensation contracts, the theory does provide a framework for structuring our empirical analysis. In particular, agency theory can be used to specify the properties of any two generic variables that are relevant for evaluating an agent's performance. Moreover, the theory suggests both a functional form relating the informational properties of the performance variables to parameters of the agent's compensation scheme, and a means of controlling for "other" effects on the form of the compensation scheme so that the analysis can focus on informational properties.
Since most agency models examine incentive problems in a singleperiod setting, we begin our analysis of the use of performance measures in compensation contracts by discussing the implications of these singleperiod models. We then examine the effect of multiperiod considerations on the relation between compensation and performance.
SINGLE-PERIOD AGENCY MODELS
The "standard" agency model (see Holmstrom [1979] ) analyzes incentive problems that arise when one individual, the principal, delegates decision-making tasks to another individual, the agent.* The agent's output, X, is a function of his action, a, and a random state of nature. The agent's action, which is typically interpreted as the amount of effort that he supplies, is assumed to increase the cash flow; however, the effect of the state of nature on the agent's output prevents the principal from using the output to determine unambiguously the amount of effort that was supplied. As a result, the principal must rely on imperfect measures of the agent's actions, such as his output and other information {y) for both evaluation and motivation. Holmstrom [1979] shows that the agent's compensation as a function of the performance variables x and y, denoted c(x, y), is the solution to the following equation (assuming an interior solution):
U'[c{x,y)]
= X
where U{-) is the agent's utility function for money (we assume that the principal is risk neutral), f{x,y\a)is the density function of the variables X and y given the agent's effort, fa{x,y\a) is the derivative of the density function with respect to the agent's effort, X is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint that specifies the lower bound on the level of expected utility that the contract can provide to the agent, and /tt > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint that ensures that the agent's choice of effort be incentive compatible.
• * Our analysis concentrates on incentive problems that arise from the unobservability of the agent's action (i.e., moral hazard problems). Other contracting problems, such as those that arise when the agent's skill is unknown (i.e., reputation and screening issues), are beyond the scope of our analysis. Another limitation of the agency models that we employ is that they assume that the agent is responsible only for deciding how much effort to supply; decisions involving a "risk-return" trade-off are ignored.
The performance variables x and y affect the agent's compensation through their effect on the term fa{x, y \ a)/f{x, y | a). As discussed in Holmstrom [1979] and Milgrom [1981] , this term is equivalent to the derivative of the logarithm of the likelihood function f{x, y\a) with respect to the agent's effort, a. This provides an informational interpretation to the use of the variables x and y in the contract.® Given the generality of the model, equation (1) provides little guidance regarding the functional form of the relation between the agent's compensation and the performance measures x and y. In order to derive empirical implications from this equation, we place additional structure on the model by making more specific assumptions about the form of the agent's utility function and the form of the probability distributions. In particular, we assume that the agent's utility function is a member of the power class of utility functions, which can be represented as: me) = i c\ (2)
-K
This class of utility functions, which exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion and constant proportional risk aversion, is commonly used in analytical work in agency theory." The parameter K represents the coefficient of proportional risk aversion for the agent, where higher values of K correspond to greater degrees of risk aversion. For this class of utility functions, U'{c) = c"" and 1/U'(c) = c". Substituting the agent's marginal utility into equation (1) yields:
We also impose some structure on the form of the probability distributions. As Banker and Datar [1987] show, the term fa{x, y \ a)/f{x, y \ a) is linear in x and y for a large class of probability distributions.^ In particular, we assume that:
* Note that although the principal's utility is a direct function of the firm's stock price (e.g., the variable x), agency theory does not imply that the optimal contract simply ties the agent's compensation exclusively to the firm's stock price. In particular, the random state of nature that affects security prices introduces noise into this performance measure from the perspective of evaluating the agent's performance. The existence of this noise implies that there are potential benefits to supplementing security prices with other measures of performance (e.g., accounting numbers) in evaluating the agent's actions.
" There are also a variety of empirical studies which lend some support to the use of the power utility function (see Friend and Blume [1975] and Litzenberger and Ronn [1986] ).
' The class of distributions includes the exponential, normal (where the agent's effort affects the mean otx andy), and the binomial distributions, among others.
For the class of distributions considered in Banker and Datar [1987] , the coefficients on the variables x and y can be interpreted as representing the "signal-to-noise ratios" of the performance variables. In particular, we have:
and Oy = Ox = , ; 7 J and Oy = ; r var(x|a) var(y|a)
where s(-| a) is the (conditional) sensitivity of the mean of the signal to the agent's effort, and var(-| a) is the variance of the signal given the agent's effort.* Substituting equation (4) into equation (3) implies:
Combining terms yields a linear expression on the right-hand side of equation (5):
The relation specified in equation (6) is complex; it is linear only if K = 1, which corresponds to a logarithmic utility function for the agent.M oreover, the parameters X and fi, which affect the intercept and the slopes on x and y, depend on the attractiveness of the manager's outside employment opportunities, his disutility for effort, the "magnitude" of the agency problem, and the form of the production function. Thus, the slope coefficients (^^ and /3y) on the performance measures of interest are confounded by all of these factors, making interpretations of crosssectional differences in the slope coefficients problematic.
However, one implication of the model is that for a given firm, if the performance measures are multiplied by their respective "signal-to-noise" ratios, the theory implies that the coefficients on the "rescaled" performance measures will be equal. To see this, equation (5) can be expressed as:
Equation (7) implies that the coefficients on the "rescaled variables" (i.e., b,Xx -E{x\a)] and by{y -E{y\ a)]) are equal to ^7-Although the * For example, if x and y aie distributed as bivariate normal random variables whose means are affected by the agent's effort, we have:
The relation may also be nonlinear because equation (6) applies only for interior solutions for the compensation function. More generally, the optimal sharing rule will include a lower bound. In this case, equation (6) becomes: magnitude of the coefficients on the "rescaled variables" will differ crosssectionally as a function of /xy, the theory predicts that the coefficients on the "rescaled variables" will be equal for a given firm.
Another implication of the model is that the confounding effects of cross-sectional differences in the term fiy can be reduced by computing the ratio of the slope coefficients from equation (6). That is, the ratio of the slope coefficients is:^
Equation (8) implies that the ratio of the slope coefficients is a function of the ratio of the "signal-to-noise" ratios of the two performance variables. An increase in either the precision (i.e., the inverse of the noise) of a performance variable or its sensitivity to the agent's actions will, ceteris paribus, increase the relative weight the variable receives in the compensation function.
MULTIPERIOD CONSIDERATIONS
Most multiperiod agency models suggest that compensation contracts have "memory" (e.g., Lambert [1983] and Rogerson [1985] ). That is, the agent's compensation in a period will depend not only on the realizations of the performance measures in that period but also on their realizations in prior periods.^" In particular, if we assume that the agent's utility function is additively separable over time (in addition to the assumptions about the agent's utility function and production function discussed in the previous section), Lambert [1983] shows that the optimal contract can be expressed as:
where the subscript t refers to time, the expected values for the performance measures x and y are now conditioned upon the actions in that period as well as prior realizations of the performance variables, and the slope coefficients are permitted to depend on the prior realizations of the performance variables. From a theoretical perspective, little is known about how the realizations of the performance variables in one period affect the slope coefficients in subsequent periods. Moreover, from an empirical perspective, it is difficult to estimate the functional form of a compensation scheme whose slope coefficients vary over time as a function of the prior-period realizations of the performance measures. For these reasons, we suppress any dependence between the slope in one period and the realizations of '° See Fellingham, Newman, and Suh [1987] for conditions on the form of the agent's utility function for which the optimal contract does not involve memory. the performance measures in prior periods. Therefore, we assume that the slope coefficients, fix and fiy, are proportional to the time-series average of the signal-to-noise ratios of the performance measures.
Under the above assumptions, the compensation scheme can be expressed as a linear function that relates the first difference in compensation raised to the K power to the "surprise" in the performance measures in the period:
In the empirical analysis, we estimate the slope coefficients of equation (10) for each firm using time-series data for compensation, market performance, and accounting performance. The estimated slope coefficients are then used to analyze whether the relative weights assigned to security market and accounting numbers in compensation contracts are related to the signal-to-noise ratios of these performance variables (as predicted in equations (7) and (8)).
Sample
Our sample of firms was primarily obtained from the Forbes annual compensation survey, which publishes compensation data for firms in at least one of the Forbes 500 listings (e.g., assets, sales, market value, or net profits). The survey includes data on cash compensation for the chief executive officer (CEO), years as CEO, years with the company, and for years 1970 to 1973 the value of shares owned by the CEO (and where appropriate, his family). The typical annual survey includes data for 700 to 800 firms.
We include firms in the sample if they satisfy five criteria. First, a complete history for cash compensation from 1970 to 1984 was available from various sources, including the Forbes data and proxy statements. Second, each firm was required to have the market value of equity ownership for the CEO during each year from 1970 to 1973 in the Forbes data. Third, the number of shares owned by the CEO (or his family) was reported in either the Corporate Data Exchange (CDE) Stock Ownership Directory or proxy statements available to the researchers.^^ Fourth, each firm was required to have selected financial data (discussed below) on the annual Compustat or CRSP files. Finally, each firm was required to have a constant fiscal year-end from 1970 to 1984.
The final sample of 370 firms consists of 188 industrial (not including natural resource firms) companies; 29 natural resource or petroleumprocessing firms, 77 utilities or transportation companies, 25 retail or hotel firms, 48 banks or insurance companies, and 3 firms in unique industrial groups. These firms had a median of one CEO change (i.e., two separate CEOs) during the 15 years from 1970 to 1984. In addition, the executives had been employed by the firm a median of 27 years and had been the CEO of the firm for a median of six years.
Estimation of the Slope Coefficients on the Performance Measures

MEASUREMENT OF THE PERFORMANCE VARIABLES
Because agency theory does not identify the precise procedures for measuring the relevant accounting (corrresponding to the variable y) and security market (corresponding to the variable x) performance indexes, we make this choice on the basis of observed institutional contractual arrangements and ease in interpreting the empirical results. In order to increase the comparability between the accounting and market measures of performance, we express both variables in terms of rates of return. The security market return (hereafter, RET), defined as the sum of the firm's capital gains and dividends divided by the stock price at the beginning of the year, has a natural interpretation as a measure of the firm's performance from the perspective of shareholders. We have chosen Return on Equity (hereafter, ROE), which is the firm's earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by the average common shareholders' equity, as a "comparable" measure of accounting performance. This measure frequently appears as an explicit performance measure in bonus contracts disclosed in proxy statements.
The discussion in section 2.2 suggested that the relevant measure for each performance variable is its "surprise" component. Since the stochastic process describing the ROE performance variable exhibits positive autocorrelation (Foster [1986] ), we use the change in ROE as our empirical measure of the surprise component.^^ Because the RET performance measure is generally considered to be uncorrelated over time, we use its level as our empirical market performance measure.^'^T he evidence in Freeman, Ohlson, and Penman [1982] and Foster [1986] indicates that although the ROE variable exhibits positive autocorrelation, it is a stationary process. Since the use of the first difference in ROE implicitly assumes that ROE follows a random walk, we also conducted the analysis with an alternative specification of the ROE variable. On the basis of the evidence provided in Foster [1986, table 7 .11], we used ROE, -.5R0E,-i as the "surprise" in the accounting performance variable in period t. The time-series results (e.g., the average explanatory power of the regressions and the average magnitude of the tstatistics), which are not reported, were similar to the results reported in table 1. Although the statistical fit of the cross-sectional analysis (not reported) was generally weaker than the results reported in the text, the overall results were substantively similar.^ Ideally, the ex ante expected value of RET would be subtracted from the realization of RET in order to derive the surprise component of RET. In principle, the expected rate of return on the firm's stock price could be estipiated by employing an asset pricing model. For example, under the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the expected return on a firm's stock price is a function of the risk-free rate, the firm's beta, and the expected return on the market portfolio. Since estimating the expected return on the market portfolio is beyond
MEASUREMENT OF COMPENSATION
We use cash compensation (i.e., salary plus annual bonus) as our measure of executive compensation. Although cash compensation does not value the executive's entire remuneration package, salary plus bonus is almost always a significant portion of total compensation (salary plus bonus, long-term bonuses, perquisites, pensions, grants of stock, and stock options)."^^ For example, Benston [1985] and surveys by Booz, Allen, and Hamilton [1983] and Hay Associates [1981] report that salary plus bonus represents between 80% and 90% of total compensation.^Ĉ onsistent with most studies of compensation, we exclude changes in the value of the manager's holdings of stock and stock options from the measure of compensation.^'' We recognize, however, that the choice between accounting and security market measures of performance in the salary and bonus portion of compensation may depend on the structure of the remainder of the manager's wealth. Therefore (as discussed in more detail below), we examine whether the relative weight placed on market versus accounting performance in the compensation contract is related to the extent to which the manager's other wealth is tied to the firm's stock price.
the scope of our analysis, we do not estimate the expected value of RET for each period. Instead, our analysis implicitly assumes that the expected value of RET is constant over time. Since our empirical analysis uses real rates of return, this assumption may not be too unrealistic. If the expected value for RET is constant over time, it will simply appear in the intercept of the regression.
"See Antle and Smith [1986] and Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia [1987] for a discussion of the issues involved in valuing various components of compensation.^ This discussion focuses on the level of compensation. For our purposes, the more relevant issue is whether the inclusion of other components of compensation has a significant impact on the slope coefficients relating compensation to performance. Jensen and Murphy [1987] provide some evidence on this issue with respect to the slope coefficient on the security market measure of performance. In particular, they find that the slope coefficient that relates salary plus bonus to changes in shareholder wealth is not significantly different from the slope coefficient that relates "total compensation" to changes in shareholder wealth. To our knowledge, there is no evidence regarding whether the slope coefficient on the accounting performance variable would be significantly affected by the inclusion of other components of compensation.
" It is unclear whether these gains and losses should be viewed as a component of the manager's compensation (narrowly defined) or as income from personal investments. The value of these components of the manager's wealth are, by definition, directly tied to changes in the firm's stock price. For this reason, our slope coefficients will understate the magnitude of the relation between the manager's total wealth and his firm's stock price performance. We attempt to control for any resulting misspecification of our model by including a measure of the magnitude of the manager's stockholdings as an independent variable in the cross-sectional analysis. Consistent with most studies (see Lambert and Larcker [forthcoming] and Jensen and Murphy [1987] for exceptions), we also ignore any future-period effects on cash compensation that arise as a result of current-period perform-
BOX-COX ESTIMATION
In estimating the relation between compensation and performance, prior research has generally used either compensation or the natural logarithm of compensation as the dependent variable. These specifications are generally made without any guidance from economic theory.^Î n contrast, our analytical agency model, expressed in equation (10), suggests that the relation between compensation and the accounting and market measures of performance can be expressed as: ^® c/ -c?_i = ;8o + pBosiROEt -ROE,-:,) + pRBTRETt + e^ (11) where et represents a disturbance term.^® The dependent variable is the change in cash compensation raised to the power K, where K is the agent's coefficient or proportional risk aversion.
Since the value of K is unknown (to the researcher), the parameters of equation (11) cannot be directly estimated using techniques such as multiple regression. However, Box and Cox [1964] have developed a procedure for estimating regression equations in which some or all of the variables are transformed by raising them to a power which is a parameter that must also be estimated. In particular, they show that the parameters K, Po, PROE, and ^RET can be estimated via a maximum likelihood approach which utilizes iterative OLS procedures.^"
RESULTS OF BOX-COX AND MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
The parameters of equation (11) were estimated separately for each firm, and summary statistics for these parameter estimates are presented in table 1. The mean (median) /^-squared of the estimation equations is "The choice of the logarithmic transformation is usually defended on unspecified "statistical grounds." In our model, the use of a logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable is not consistent with any member of the power utility functions.
An exception is Masson [1971] who uses compensation (more precisely, the percentage change in compensation) raised to the % power. Interestingly, Masson states that this procedure is designed to reflect the decreasing marginal utility of compensation in the trade-off between income and leisure (i.e., effort). ** Cash compensation and RET are expressed in 1967 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The accounting return (ROE) is expressed in nominal terms because of our inability to estimate various asset layers and specific asset price indexes.
'^ The disturbance term arises from other performance measures that may be used by shareholders in compensating the manager but which are not incorporated into our empirical model.° More specifically, for a given value of K, the maximum likelihood parameters estimates for /3o, fiROE, and ^RET can be derived by conducting a multiple regression of the transformed dependent variable on the independent variables. Following Box and Cox [1964] , the dependent variable is deflated by the factor «:(c)*~', where c is the geometric mean of the compensation variable. Deflating the dependent variable by this factor leaves the magnitudes of the regression coefficients PROA and ^RET relatively unaffected by changes in the parameter K and makes it easier to calculate the likelihood function.
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for the Box-Cox Estimation of the Time-Series Relationship Between Compensation (c) and the Change in Return on Equity (ROE) and the Level of Security
Market Return (RET) as Expressed in Equation (11):" (11) were estimated separately for each firm using 14 timeseries observations. Compensation data is expressed in thousands of dollars. The table presents summary statistics for the 370 estimations.
'' K is the power in the BOX-COX transformation (the search for K was restricted to the interval from -1.0 to 10.0 in increments of .05.
), K LO (K UP) is the lower (upper) boimd for the 95% confidence interval for K,B 0 (TBO) is the estimated intercept (t-statistic), B ROE (T ROE) is the estimated slope (i-statistic) on the ROE variable, B RET (T RET)
is the estimated slope (t-statistic) on the RET variable, RSQD is the fl-squared of the estimation, DW^ is the Durbin-Watson statistic, and AR is the estimated first-order autocorrelation in the residuals.° TRMEAN trims the smallest 5% and the largest 5% of the observations and averages the remaining observations. Q3 is the third quartile and Ql is the first quartile. 0.272 (0.205). The mean (median) j-statistic for the ROE slope is 1.283 (0.939), while the mean (median) t-statistic for the RET slope is only 0.368 (0.337). If we aggregate the t-statistics cross-sectionally under the assumption of cross-sectional independence, the corresponding z-statistics for the ROE slope and the RET slope are 22.70 and 6.51, respectively. Since the regressions are conducted over the same time period (i.e., 1970-84) , it is unlikely that the slope coefficients are independent across firms; however, only 3 (33) independent observations out of the 370 firms are needed in order for the average t-slatistic on the ROE {RET) slope to be significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). These results suggest that cash compensation is statistically related to both RET and changes in ROE.
The estimates of the parameter K in table 1 are imprecise; the mean length of the 95% confidence interval is 3.05.^^ Nevertheless, it is instruc-' As discussed in Box and Cox [1964, pp. 214-15 ], the confidence intervals for H. were derived by calculating the range of K'S which yielded values for the logarithm of the likelihood function that were within .50%^ (df = 1) of the function's maximum value.
tive to compare our estimates of K with the predictions of the theory and with the values of K implicitly assumed in prior research. Agency theory implies that the parameter K represents the agent's coefficient of proportional risk aversion, which should be positive. The mean (median) value of K was 0.784 (0.400), and only 5.4% of the estimates of K were negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level.^^ Many prior studies have analyzed compensation in first differences, which implicitly assumes a value for K of one. Our results indicate that 74.3% of the confidence intervals for K included one, which suggests some support for this specification.^Ŝ ince the confidence interval for K typically includes the value of one, we also estimated the relation between compensation and RET and ROE using standard OLS multiple regression. The slope coefficients, t-statistics, and explanatory power of these mutliple regressions (not reported) are very similar to the results derived from the Box-Cox analysis. This similarity is probably due to the inability of the Box-Cox procedure to distinguish between alternative values of K.^*
The results in table 1 suggest that cash compensation is more highly associated with differences in accounting returns than with levels of security market returns.^^ Some additional support for this statement^
The average t-statistics on the performance variables and the i?-squared of the estimation procedures for the subsample of firms for which the estimate for K was positive (i.e., the cases that are most consistent with the theory) are virtually identical to the results reported in table 1.
' The inability to provide a precise estimate for K is likely to be due to our small sample size (14 time-series observations per firm) and/or the limited range of compensation numbers. That is, the function c' can be well approximated by a linear function of c provided that the range of c is not "too large." To provide some evidence on this issue, we estimated a linear regression between the compensation numbers and the square of compensation for each firm. The mean (median) iJ-squared from these regressions was 0.982 (0.990). Similarly, a linear regression of compensation on the natural logarithm of compensation yielded a mean (median) fl-squared of 0.970 (0.989). Finally, a regression of the square of compensation on the natural logarithm of compensation yielded a mean (median) K-squared of 0.914 (0.959). These results suggest that it would be difficult to determine whether the "best" specification of the dependent variable is the logarithm of compensation (K -0), compensation (/c = 1), or the square of compensation (n = 2), which is consistent with the results in table 1. The finding that a linear specification of the compensation variable works "well" for most firms does not imply, however, that crosssectional differences in the risk aversion coefficients of managers are unimportant.
* As discussed in n. 20, the dependent variable in the Box-Cox estimation was scaled so that the magnitude of the slope coefficients is relatively unaffected by the choice of K. This will result in the magnitude of the Box-Cox slope coefficient being "close" to the magnitude of the mqltiple regression slope coefficients (in which K is exogenously set equal to one).^
The magnitude of the coefficient on stock market returns is roughly consistent with the restilts of other studies. For example, Jensen and Murphy [1987] estimate the slope coefficient from a pooled time-series cross-sectional regression of changes in the real salary plus bonus paid to CEOs on the real change in the value of their firm's shareholder wealth to be 0.0000094. To transform this number into a coefficient for d regression in which real stock price return is the independent variable, we multiply the coefficient estimated in can be obtained by examining the results of univariate regressions of the change in compensation on the change in ROE and the change in compensation on RET. In these regressions (not reported), the mean tstatistic on ROE was 1.18, compared to 0.548 for RET. Moreover, the average E-squared for the regressions involving ROE was 0.186, compared to 0.087 for RET. Therefore, the average incremental iJ-squared for the ROE performance variable was 0.167, whereas the average incremental JR-squared for RETv/as only 0.068.
Hypotheses on the Relative Weights Assigned to the Performance Measures
We discuss two different approaches to testing hypotheses concerning the relative weights assigned to RET and ROE in compensation contracts. First, we discuss a methodology that tests the agency model prediction that, for a given firm, the slope coefficients on the performance measures scaled by their signal-to-noise ratios should be equal. Second, we discuss a methodology which is designed to address the problems associated with obtaining precise measures of the signal-to-noise ratios of RET and ROE (the statistical aspects of this approach are presented in section 6 and Appendixes A and B). Finally, we develop specific research hypotheses for empirical examination.
"EQUALITY OF COEFFICIENTS" APPROACH
Equation (7) implies that if the performance measures ROE and RET are multiplied by their respective signal-to-noise ratios, then the slope coefficients on the "rescaled" performance measures will be equal. This hypothesis can be tested by conducting a time-series estimation of changes in compensation on the rescaled performance measures, and then testing for equality of the slope coefficients. If it were possible to measure the signal-to-noise ratios for each firm without error, this "equality of coefficients" test procedure would allow for a powerful test of the agency theory relationship developed in section 2.
Although the agency theory model suggests that the "noise" in a performance measure is related to its variance, the theory provides no Jensen and Murphy by the average market value of the firms in our sample, which is $876,000,000 in real $1967, and then divide by 1000.0 to adjust for the fact that we measure compensation in thousands of dollars. The resulting coefficient is 8.23, which is consistent with the mean (median) coefficient of 9.54 (6.78) reported in table 1. Of course, these two sets of results are not strictly comparable because the results in table 1 are based on a multiple regression in which both accounting and market measures of performance are used as independent variables, whereas Jensen and Murphy use only a market measure of performance in their regression. In order to achieve a more comparable set of results, we also conducted a simple regression in which the market measure of performance was the only independent variable. The mean slope coefficient from these regressions was 16.67, which is still roughly the same size as the coefficient reported in Jensen and Murphy. insights into how to measure the sensitivity of the performance measures to the agent's actions. If we make some assumptions about the signal-tonoise ratios of the performance measures, we can use the "equality of coefficients" test procedure to test the joint hypothesis that the agency theory model and the assumption about the signal-to-noise ratios are both correct. For example, if the signal-to-noise ratios of RET and ROE are hypothesized to be equal, the theory predicts that the slope coefficients on the RET and ROE performance measures will be equal. A crude test of the equality of slope coefficients can be developed by determining whether the ROE slope coefficients are statistically different (in central tendency) from the RET slope coefficients for our sample of 370 firms. For the Box-Cox estimates, the ROE slope coefficient is substantially larger than the RET slope coefficient (matched-pairs t = 11.52 and Wilcoxon 2 = 11.19).
An alternative hypothesis is that the "noise" of a signal is measured by its time-series variance, and that the sensitivities of the accounting and market measures of performance are equal. After defiating the performance variables by their variances, our results fail to reject the hypothesis that the Box-Cox slope coefficients on the "rescaled" performance variables are (on average) equal (matched-pairs t = 0.42 and Wilcoxon z = -0.45).
We do not rely on these "equality of coefficients" tests because they are confounded if the signal-to-noise ratios of the two performance measures are measured with error. The resulting estimates for the regression coefficients on the "rescaled variables" would be inconsistent, and the test for equality of coefficients would not produce valid inferences. Specifically, we do not know if the slope coefficients are equal because {i) the agency model is actually a good description of contracting, or {ii) there is so much measurement error in the estimates of the signal-tonoise variables that this test has no power to reject the research hypothesis, or {iii) the coefficient on accounting performance is higher for one group of firms but lower for another group of firms, and the absence of any cross-sectional analysis obscures this fact.
MOTIVATION FOR CONDUCTING A LATENT VARIABLE CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS
The problems associated with estimating the signal-to-noise ratios of the performance measures suggest that it is desirable to employ a methodology that explicitly considers measurement error. As developed in equation (8), the agency theory model predicts that the ratio of the regression coefficients on the (unsealed) performance measures provides an estimate of the ratio of the signal-to-noise ratios of the performance measures. Our statistical procedures are designed to assess whether the ratio of these estimated regression coefficients is associated with variables that are hypothesized to have some relationship to the sensitivity and/ or noise of the performance variables.
The desirability of this approach is influenced by the degree to which measurement error can be "controlled" in the variables that proxy for the sensitivity and noise of the performance measures. In the remainder of this section, we discuss the variables used to proxy for the relative weights assigned to the RET and ROE performance measures in the compensation contract, and to proxy for the sensitivity and noise of RET and ROE with respect to evaluating a manager's performance. In section 6, we use a latent variable analysis to examine whether cross-sectional differences in the relative weights assigned to RET versus ROE are related to the variables that proxy for the sensitivity and noise of these performance measures. This methodological approach enables us to develop tests of our research hypothesis that "control" measurement error in a manner not available in the "quality of coefficients" test procedure.
5.2.1. Ratio of the Slope Coefficients. Our dependent variable, denoted PERF MIX, is the degree to which cash compensation is tied to RET relative to ROE. As discussed in section 2, we use the ratio of the slope coefficients on the two performance variables to control for other factors that affect the relation between compensation and performance for a particular firm.^^ One important disadvantage of this approach is that the ratio must be calculated from estimates of the slope coefficients, and the distribution of the ratio of two random variables can be complicated and possess undesirable properties.
The statistical distribution of the ratio of the slope coefficients is especially sensitive to either measurement error or a near-zero value for the denominator. To reduce these problems, we place the slope coefficient with the more precise (and more positive) estimate in the denominator problem in interpreting empirical results concerning the ratio of the slope coefficients on the performance variables (fij0y) is that this ratio is sensitive to the scaling of the performance variables x and y. For example, if variable x tends to be, on average, ten times as large as variable y in a given firm, then the slope coefficient on x will, ceteris paribus, be approximately Vio as large as the coefficient on y. Clearly, this does not imply that variable y is a more "important" performance measure in contracting than variable x. This problem is exacerbated if the scaling differences between x and y vary cross-seotionally. For example, assume that for another firm, the variable x is only five times as large as variable y. In this situation, the ratio of the slope coefficient on : «: to y would be approximately y&. More important, it would be inappropriate to conclude that the "informativeness" of variable y relative to variable x is twice as large for the first firm as for the second firm.
A common (statistical) solution to this type of interpretation problem is to deflate the performance measures by their standard deviations. While this will eliminate scaling problems, it also makes it difficult to test hypotheses about the amount of noise in the performance variables. That is, the transformed measures of performance will have, by construction, a variance of one, which tends to eliminate any cross-sectional variation in the relative amounts of noise in the performance measures x and y.
We repeated the analysis using standardized performance measures in the time-series regressions. The cross-sectional analysis then related the ratio of the slope coefficients to the CORR, GROWTH, and OTHER constructs. The results, not reported, were similar to the results reported in the text. of the ratio.^^ As the results in table 1 indicate, the slope coefficient on ROE was much more likely to be positive and statistically significant than the coefficient on RET. For this reason, the PERF MIX construct is defined to be the ratio of the slope coefficient on RET to the slope coefficient on ROE.
Another problem with the ratio of the slope coefficients arises because the estimated slope coefficients on RET and ROE can be either positive or negative. As a result, this ratio can be negative if only the numerator is negative or if only the denominator is negative. This complicates the cross-sectional analysis because these outcomes have quite different interpretations for our theoretical analysis. We consider three different means of dealing with this problem, summarized in panel A of table 2. The first approach is to consider only firms with positive slope coefficients on both ROE and RET. This proxy for the PERF MIX variable is denoted MR-PP (BC-PP) if the slope coefficients were estimated using multiple regression (Box-Cox) . A second approach is to allow the numerator of the ratio (i.e., the slope on the R.ET variable) to have any sign but only consider firms with a positive slope coefficient on ROE. This proxy is denoted MR-AP (BC-AP) if the slope coefficients are estimated via multiple regression (Box-Cox) . Finally, we compute the ratio after reestimating the slope coefficients on RET and ROE with the constraint that each slope coefficient and the coefficient of proportional risk aversion be positive.^® This proxy is denoted MR-CC (BC-CC) if the slope coefficients are estimated via multiple regression (Box-Cox) .
In the subsequent discussion, analysis using MR-PP and/or BC-PP as the dependent variable is referred to as the "Positive/Positive" case. Similarly, analysis using MR-AP and/or BC-AP as the dependent variable is referred to as the "Anything/Positive" case. Finally, analysis using the MR-CC and/or BC-CC variables is referred to as the "Constrained/ Constrained" case. The Positive/Positive and Constrained/Constrained cases assume that, a priori, the slope coefficients on both performance measures should be positive. The Anything/Positive case assumes that, a priori, the coefficient on the RET variable could be negative, perhaps to "undo" some of the manager's exposure to risk in his other wealth. 5.2.2. Noise in the Performance Measures. The noise in a signal re-'The results in table 1 indicate that the precision of the estimates for the slope coefficients varies considerably across firms. This suggests that the ratio of the estimated slope coefficients will possess heteroscedasticity. If the dependent variable in the crosssectional analysis consisted simply of a single slope coefficient, the heteroscedasticity problem could be solved by deflating the slope coefficients (and the independent variables of the cross-sectional analysis) by the standard error of the slope coefficient estimates. See Saxonhouse [1976] for additional discussion of this point. This approach is not pursued because our dependent variable is the ratio of the slope coefficients, and it is not clear how to compute the standard error of the ratio from the individual standard errors of the slope coefficients.^
The slope coefficients were constrained to lie within the interval from .01 to 5000, and the value of K was constrained to lie in the interval from .01 to 10. fleets the degree to which it is influenced by factors other than the manager's actions. Equation (8) indicates that the appropriate measure of the amount of noise in a signal is the variance of the signal given the agent's action. Holding the (conditional) sensitivity of the mean of the signal to the agent's effort constant for both signals, agency theory implies a positive relationship between the ratio of the slope on RET to the slope on ROE and the inverse of the ratio of the "noise" in RET to the "noise" in ROE.
We consider three proxies for the relative amounts of NOISE in the two performance measures. The first measure, denoted RTVAR, is the ratio of the time-series variation in the change in ROE to the time-series variation in RET?^ One limitation of this measure is that the time-serieŝ^ It might seem that the ratio of the slope coefficients is related to the inverse of the ratio of the variances of the performance variables by construction. For example, consider the case in which a dependent variable, z, is related to two independent variables, x and y, which are measured without error, in the following fashion: z = i8o + fSxX + fiyy + e, with cov(x, e) = cov(y, e) = 0.
If, for convenience, we assume that x and y are independent, it is well known that the ratio of the slope coefficients on the two independent variables can be written as:
This expression makes it seem as if the hypothesized relation between the ratio of the slope coefficients and the ratio of the variances is true by construction. However, if we expand the expressions for cov(2, x) and cov(2, y), we have: variation in a signal will not only reflect the amount of "noise" in the signal but also the effect of changes in the agent's action over time. As the results in table 3 indicate, the mean (median) ratio of the variance of ROE to the variance of RET was 0.051 (0.012). A second measure for the amount of noise in a signal can be obtained by decomposing the time-series variation in a signal into a market (or industry) component and a firm-specific component. If the market component of the performance measure is thought to be unrelated to the manager's actions, as in the relative performance evaluation literature (see Holmstrom [1982] ), then the variance of the market component of the performance evaluation measure is a more appropriate measure of the amount of noise in a signal.^"
The second measure, denoted RSVAR, is the ratio of the variance of the systematic component of ROE to the variance of the systematic component of RET. This ratio was computed by first conducting timeseries regressions of the change in ROE for the firm on the change in ROE for a value-weighted market index and the RET for the firm on the value-weighted market RET. Descriptive statistics for these "marketmodel" regressions are presented in table 4 (panels A and B). The market component of the change in ROE accounts for (on average) approximately 18% of the total variation in the change in ROE, whereas the market accounts for (on average) approximately 37% of the total variation in RET. For each firm, the results of these regressions were used to calculate the variance of the systematic component of the change in ROE and the variance of the systematic component of RET. As the results in table 3 indicate, the mean (median) value of RSVAR was 0.064 (0.004).
The final proxy for the NOISE construct is derived from discussions in the security price literature which link the magnitude of the correlation between market prices and accounting numbers with the amount of noise in accounting numbers. In fact, Salamon and Smith [1979] have suggested that the correlation between accounting numbers and market prices provides an explicit measure of the amount of "managerial misrepSince cov(:x:, y) = cov(x, e) = cov(3', e) = 0, it is easy to see that the apparent dependence of the ratio of the slope coefficients on the ratio of the variances disappears. While these covariances will not be exactly equal to zero in a finite sample, they are equally likely to be positive or negative, so there will be no systematic dependence between the size of the ratio of the slope coefficients and the size of the ratio of the variances.
™ It is not clear that the "market" component of a performance measure constitutes noise when the executive is, in part, responsible for deciding the type of projects (and the industry) in which the firm invests. For example, Dye [1987] shows that a "pure" relative performance evaluation scheme can lead to suboptimal project selections. Antle and Smith [1986] provide empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that total executive compensation (including the change in the value of shares of stock and stock options held by the executive) is more sensitive to the firm-specific component of performance than the industry component of performance. However, they do not provide any evidence regarding the use of relative performance evaluation in the salary plus bonus portion of compensation. 
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• See table 2 for a definition of the variables. '' iV is the number of firms with available data. TRMEAN trims the smallest 5% and the largest 5% of the observations and averages the remaining observations. Q3 is the third quartile and Ql is the first quartile.
resentation" in accounting numbers.^^ However, this correlation measures noise only from the perspective of assessing the value of the firm. As discussed by Gjesdal [1981] , an information system that is useful in valuing the firm need not be useful in assessing a manager's performance. Therefore, rankings of information systems in terms of their value in assessing (i) a manager's performance and (u) the value of the firm need not be the same.
The correlation between the RET and ROE performance measures, which we denote ZTRANS, was obtained by conducting a regression of the firm's RET on its change in ROE. The results of these regressions are summarized in table 4, panel C. For example, the mean (median) Rsquared for these regressions was 0.136 (0.084). In order to convert the correlation coefficient from this regression into a more normally distributed random variable, we defined ZTRANS to be the Fisher transformation of the correlation coefficient.
Sensitivity of the Performance Measures to the Agent's Actions.
While security market prices are thought to estimate the expected present value of all future consequences of a manager's actions, accounting numbers are frequently criticized for their inability to reflect future-' The accounting literature is replete with articles on earnings manipulation (see Foster [1986] and Verrecchia [1986] ).
TABLE 4 Summary Statistics for the Results of Regression Analyses of the Systematic Component of the Change in Return on Assets (ROE), the Systematic Component of Security Market Return (RET), and the Correlation Between the RET and the Change in ROE for a Sample of370FirmsÂ
. 
INT (T INT) is the estimated intercept (t-statistic) in the regression, SLOPE (T SLOPE) is the estimated slope (i-statistic)
, RSQD is the coefficient of determination for the regression, DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic, and AR is the estimated first-order autocorrelation of residuals for the regression. ' • TRMEAN trims the smallest 5% and the largest 5% of the observations and averages the remaining observations. Q3 is the third quartile and QI is the first quartile.
period consequences of current-period actions (e.g., Rappaport [1986] ). While it is possible, in principle, for historical-cost-based accounting rates of return to reflect the present value of the firm's future cash flows by using "economic" depreciation (see the discussion in Beaver [1981] ), it is unclear whether conventional accounting practices achieve this result. In particular, constraints imposed by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles may limit the ability of accounting numbers to reflect the cash flows that are expected to arise in the future as a result of the firm's current-period actions.
If accounting-based performance measures are not as sensitive as market-based performance measures to the actions of the manager that have future-period consequences, agency theory predicts that, ceteris paribus, compensation schemes will be less accounting oriented in situations in which firms are in the "early" periods (before the effects of the manager's investments are reflected in accounting numbers), and more sensitive to accounting numbers in "later" periods (when the effects of the manager's investments are reflected in accounting earnings) .^^ This hypothesis therefore predicts that the ratio of the RET slope to the ROE slope is positively associated with the extent to which the firm is in the "early" versus "later" stages of investment during the same period in which the slopes of the compensation function are estimated.
We assume that the extent to which a firm is in the early stages of investment is related to the GROWTH oi the firm, as measured by real growth in total assets (denoted A GROW) and real growth in sales {S GROW). These growth rates were computed over the period 1970-84, the same period over which the slope coefficients in the compensation function were estimated. We assume that firms in the "early" stages of investment will be experiencing both increases in their asset bases and increasing (as opposed to constant or declining) sales.
Other Components of Managerial Wealth.
If the other components of a manager's wealth are highly correlated with the firm's stock price, there may be little incentive benefit to also linking the manager's cash compensation to stock price. Such a link may merely increase the manager's exposure to risk. For this reason, if the manager already has a considerable amount of his wealth tied to the firm's stock price, shareholders may desire to use other informative performance measures in the manager's compensation contract. To test this hypothesis, we examine whether the relative weight placed on RET and ROE is negatively associated with the degree to which the manager's other wealth is tied to the firm's stock price.
We consider three proxies for this construct, which is denoted OTHER. The first indicator, denoted STOCK, is the average dollar value of stock (in 1967 dollars) owned by the CEO or his family. This measure assumes that the manager's "other incentives" are proportional to the size of his equity investment in the firm. For example, the change in the manager's wealth for a given value of RET is proportional to the manager's equity investment. The second indicator, denoted EQ/COMP, is the average market value of equity owned by the CEO or his family divided by his cash compensation. This measure assumes that the importance of the manager's equity investment is a function of the size of this investment relative to his cash compensation. The final indicator, denoted PER- "' See Lambert [1981; and Ramanan [1986] for agency theory models which support this result.
CENT, is the percentage of the equity held by the CEO or his family. This is a commonly discussed measure of the amount of incentive the manager has to increase the firm's stock price.
For our sample of firms, the results in table 3 indicate that the mean (median) percentage of the firm's total stock held by the CEO and his family was 1.85% (.145%). Moreover, the mean (median) ratio of equity holdings to annual cash compensation was 82.8 (4.4). These numbers were computed by averaging the values for years 1970 to 1973 and 1980. 
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Compensation Contracts
The preceding analysis suggests that the relative weight assigned to RET versus ROE in the cash compensation contract is:
(i) an increasing function of the inverse of the noise ratios of the two performance measures, {ii) an increasing function of the degree to which the firm is in the "early" stages of investment, and {Hi) a decreasing function of the extent to which the manager's other wealth is tied to stock price.
CORRELATION ANALYSIS
The results in table 3 indicate that the distributions of many of the variables described above are highly skewed (particularly MR-CC, BC-CC, EQ/COMP, and STOCK). In order to obtain more "normal" distributions, we applied a logarithmic transformation to each of the variables.^^ An additional justification for applying a logarithmic transformation is that it converts the multiplicative relation expressed in equation (8) into a more easily estimated additive relation. That is, equation (8) suggests that the ratio of the slope coefficients is related to the ratio of the noise measures tim^s the ratio of the sensitivities of the two performance measures. Taking the logarithm of both sides of equation (8) results in an equation in which the logarithm of the ratio of the slope coefficients is related to the logarithm of the ratio of the noise measures plus the logarithm of the sensitivities of the performance measures.
The Pearson correlations (after applying the logarithmic transformation) among the proxies for the PERF MIX, NOISE, GROWTH, and "" Since the variables MR-AP and BC-AP contain negative values, these variables were not transformed. Moreover, since the variable ZTRANS had already been transformed into a normally distributed random variable, no adjustment was made to this variable either.
In addition, each of the distributions for the variables was winsorized (i.e., the "extreme" observations were reset to "less extreme" values-the extreme values were not deleted from the sample). No more than four data points per variable were affected by this procedure. The cutoff points were chosen on the basis of an examination of the univariate histogram for each variable.
OTHER constructs are presented in table 5.^* These results indicate that the correlations are generally consistent with the hypotheses discussed above. The correlations between the proxies for the PERFMIX construct and the NOISE construct are generally positive (14 of 18), the correlations between the proxies for the PERE MIX and the GROWTH construct are also generally positive (9 of 12), and the correlations between the PiiJjRi^ MIX proxies and the OTHER proxies all have the hypothesized negative sign. Moreover, the results in table 5 also indicate that the proxies for a given theoretical construct are generally highly correlated with each other. The only exception occurs in the NOISE construct, where the variables RTVAR and RSVAR are highly correlated with each other but virtually uncorrelated with ZTRANS. This result suggests that the variable ZTRANS is not measuring the same underlying variable as RTVAR and RSVAR. Since the theoretical justification in section 5.2.2 for the variable ZTRANS is also considerably different from the justification for the RTVAR and RSVAR variables, our subsequent empirical tests will analyze the ZTRANS variable as a distinct construct, which we refer to as CORR.
Although the results in table 5 provide information concerning the relations among the proxies for the theoretical constructs, our real concern is with the relations among the underlying constructs themselves. For example, we are interested in the correlation between the constructs PERF MIX and NOISE, as opposed to the correlation between the proxies MR-PP and RTVAR. There are at least three factors which make it difficult to assess the statistical significance of the relation between the constructs on the basis of the correlations among the proxies. First, each proxy measures its underlying construct with error. The presence of this measurement error will, ceteris paribus, attenuate the bivariate correlation coefficients. As we discuss below, the existence of multiple proxies for a given construct can, in principle, be used to reduce this problem.
Second, it is difficult to "combine" the correlations among alternative indicators for the same proxy. For example, although the correlations among all of the proxies for the PERF MIX and the OTHER constructs have the predicted signs, the statistical significance of the individual correlations (not presented) varies considerably across proxies. In the case of the PERF MIX and the GROWTH constructs, this problem is even worse because the signs of the correlations are different for the individual proxies. Inconsistencies in the significance levels and signs of the bivariate correlations make it difficult to draw conclusions concerning the research hypotheses regarding the relations among the underlying constructs.
"*' We also computed the Spearman rank-order correlations, which should be less affected by the "nonnormality" of the data, for the untransformed variables. The results (not presented) were very similar to the Pearson correlations applied to the transformed variables presented in table 5. Finally, the individual elements of the correlation matrix are simple correlations not partial correlations. Although this problem could be solved by conducting a multiple regression of each proxy for PERF MIX on all of the proxies for the remaining constructs, this would not solve the other problems discussed above. Moreover, because the proxies for a given construct are typically highly correlated, it may be difficult to obtain precise estimates of the individual coefficients.
LATENT VARIABLE ANALYSIS
In order to mitigate the measurement and interpretation problems associated with standard multivariate analysis (such as the correlation coefficients in table 5), we estimate each underlying theoretical construct, or latent variable, by "combining" each of its proxies.^® Because such a "combination" should possess less measurement error than the individual proxies, the "measurement error" bias in estimating the relations among the latent variables should be less serious. Moreover, this procedure allows the calculation of a single correlation coefficient (or regression coefficient) between any two latent variables, and this avoids difficulties in interpreting several regression coefficients for variables which attempt to measure the same construct.
To implement this procedure, we employ a latent variable structural equation model to estimate the relations among the latent or unobservable variables. Similar to most econometric analyses, we assume that the endogenous latent variable, PERF MIX, is related to the exogenous latent variables, NOISE, CORR, GROWTH, and OTHER, by the following linear expression:
where the yt are regression coefficients and f is the structural equation residual or disturbance term. The signs and significance levels of the 7, are used to examine our research hj^otheses. The statistical theory underlying this methodological approach and the computational algorithms are described in Joreskog [1969; 1971; 1978] , Browne [1984] , and Bentler [1983a; 19836] , among others, and are briefly discussed in Appendix A.
RESULTS OF THE LATENT VARIABLE ANALYSIS
As discussed in Appendix A, our data do not strictly conform to a multivariate normal distribution. This distributional assumption can bê^ Another alternative would be to select a single proxy for each construct and then estimate a multiple regression using the selected proxies. This alternative is not pursued because the selection of the "best" proxy would be arbitrary. Moreover, there is likely to be a loss of information associated with dropping the other proxies for the constructs. Finally, the "best" proxy is likely to be subject to the measurement error problems discussed in the text.
critical to the properties of maximum likelihood parameter estimates of equation (12) . In order to assess the sensitivity of our estimates to the absence of multivariate normality, we also provide estimates using elliptical distribution theory (which allows for a common kurtosis for each variable) and unweighted least squares (which makes no distributional assumptions). In addition, several assessments of the degree to which our model characterizes the observed data are presented in Appendix B.
The estimates for the parameters of the structural model are presented in table 6. In general, the maximum likelihood, elliptical distribution, and unweighted least squares procedures provide similar results in terms of coefficient estimates, statistical significance of the estimates, and explanatory power of the structural model. Moreover, the signs of the coefficients are generally the same across the three cases (Positive/ Positive, Anything/Positive, and Constrained/Constrained). In general, the slope coefficients on the NOISE, GROWTH, and OTHER variables have the predicted signs (i.e., positive, positive, and negative, respectively), and each variable has a slope coefficient that is statistically significant (at the 0.05 level, two-tailed) in at least one of the cases. The coefficient on the CORR variable was positive in every case, which implies that a lower correlation between ROE and RET is associated with a lower relative weight being placed on RET (and a higher relative weight placed on ROE), ceteris paribus. It should be noted that the statistical significance of the coefficients varies across the three cases. The significance of the GROWTH and OTHER constructs was the most consistent across the cases, and the significance of the NOISE construct was the least consistent.
Finally, the correlation matrix among the constructs (not presented) indicates that two of the exogenous constructs, NOISE and GROWTH, are significantly negatively correlated, while the GROWTH and the OTHER constructs were significantly positively correlated. Although the magnitudes of the correlations vary from case to case, the correlation between NOISE and GROWTH is approximately -0.35, and the correlation between GROWTH and OTHER is approximately 0.14. These results suggest that, ceteris paribus, high-growth firms tend to have a lower variance of ROE relative to RET and high amounts of "other incentives" tied to stock
Discussion and Summary
This paper examines the usage of accounting return on equity (ROE) and security market return (RET) as performance measures in the cash compensation (salary plus annual bonus) contracts of chief executivê As in multiple regression analysis, a high correlation between independent variables makes it difficult to obtain a precise estimate for the slope coefficients on these variables. As a result, the standard error associated with the estimate of each coefficient becomes large. officers.^'' Our analysis relies on analytical agency models, particularly the results of Holmstrom [1979] and Banker and Datar [1987] , for a theoretical framework relating executive compensation to ROE and RET based on the "informational properties" of the two performance measures. We control for the influence of "other factors" on the form of the compensation function (such as differences in the form of the agent's utility function and external opportunities) in order to concentrate on the "informational properties" oi ROE and RET.
The theoretical model specifies a linear relation between compensation (raised to a power that is unknown to the researcher) and the performance variables ROE and RET. We estimate the parameters of this relation for each firm using the Box-Cox power transformation estimation procedure. Our results suggest that cash compensation exhibits a strong positive time-series relation with ROE, but only a modest time-series relation with RET. Our estimates of the appropriate power transformation for the compensation number, which can be interpreted as an estimate of the manager's coefficient of proportional risk aversion, are imprecise. This result is consistent with the conclusions of prior researchers who indicate that their results are insensitive to different ad hoc specifications of the compensation variable.
Previous researchers have also suggested that the magnitude of the correlation and/or magnitude of the slope coefficient between compensation and RET provides evidence on the "rationality" of compensation ' We also conducted the analysis using only the "firm-specific" component of the accounting and security market measures of performance. In order to construct the firmspecific components of performance, we defined the accounting performance index to be the change in the value-weighted ROE for all firms on the Compustat tape (excluding the firms in our sample), and the security market performance index to be the (real) valueweighted CRSP index of security market returns. For each firm, we estimated a time-series regression of the firm's performance on the performance index over the period 1970-84 (a separate regression was conducted for the accounting and the security market measures of performance). The results of these regressions are summarized in table 4 (panels A and B). We then defined the "firm-specific" components of the firm's performance measure to be the residuals from these regressions.
The firm-specific components of performance were then used in the time-series regressions of compensation on performance. The results of these regressions (not reported) were similar to the results reported in table 1. In particular, the average t-statistic was much higher for the coefficient on the accounting measure of performance than for the market measure of performance. In conducting the cross-sectional analysis, the "independent variables" were constructed in a manner consistent with the time-series analysis. For example, since the time-series analysis regresses compensation on only the firm-specific component of performance, we defined the NOISE variable to be the variance of the firmspecific component of the change in ROE divided by the variance of the firm-specific component oi RET in the cross-sectional analysis. The results of the cross-sectional analysis (not reported) were similar to the results reported in the text. For example, the coefficients on the NOISE, CORR, GROWTH, and OTHER variables were generally positive, positive, positive, and negative, respectively. The coefficients were most significant for the NOISE and OTHER variables. Finally, the explanatory power of the cross-sectional analysis was greatest for the Positive/Positive case.
packages (e.g., see Coughlan and Schmidt [1985] , Murphy [1986] , and Jensen and Murphy [1987] ). However, from an agency theory perspective, there is no a priori reason to expect that a high correlation between compensation and RET is indicative of a "good" contract or a "bad" contract. Instead, our analysis suggests that the usage of RET in the contract will depend on the magnitude of its "signal-to-noise" ratio with respect to evaluating the agent's performance relative to the "signal-tonoise" ratio of other performance measures (such as ROE).
Hypotheses regarding cross-sectional differences in the relative amounts of "signal-to-noise" in ROE and RET were examined using a latent variable analysis. This methodology reduces problems that arise in cross-sectional regression analysis when the dependent and independent variables specified by the theory cannot be directly observed. The results of our cross-sectional analysis suggest that the degree to which compensation is related to RET versus ROE is positively related to the inverse of the degree o{ "NOISE" in the two performance measures. This result is consistent with the agency theory notion that the influence of factors other than the agent's action (i.e., noncontrollable factors) on a performance measure can decrease the relative weight that it receives in the compensation contract.
In addition, we find that high-"GROWTH" firms tend to place relatively more emphasis on RET rather than ROE as a performance measure. We interpret this result as consistent with the hypothesis that accounting numbers provide a less useful measure of the agent's performance when the consequences of the agent's current-period actions tend to occur in the future and are not reflected in current-period accounting numbers. We also find that firms place less importance on RET (relative to ROE) in the cash compensation contract when RET is of more importance in the OTHER components of the agent's wealth. This suggests that the overall structure of the agent's wealth plays a role in the design of each component of the agent's compensation.
Finally, our results suggest that there is a positive association between the relative influence of RET versus ROE in compensation and the correlation between RET and ROE. Alternatively stated, this result suggests that a low correlation between RET and ROE is associated with less relative weight on RET and more relative weight on ROE in the compensation function. This is consistent with the hypothesis that a lack of correlation between RET and ROE does not imply that accounting earnings contain "measurement error" from the perspective of evaluating the agent's performance. As discussed in Gjesdal [1981] , an information system that does not provide very informative signals regarding the value of the firm can provide signals that are valuable in evaluating the agent's performance.
One important limitation to our analysis arises from the "undesirable distributional properties of the ratio oi the estimated slope coefficients of compensation on RET versus ROE. As discussed in section 2, calculating the ratio of the two slope coefficients, in principle, allows us to control for "other factors" that affect the relation between compensation and performance. However, it is not clear how to handle negative slope coefficients, or how to assess the moments of the distribution of the ratio.
A related limitation is that our cross-sectional results are affected by the operational definition of the ratio of the slope coefficients. The results were strongest for the subsample of firms for which the slopes on both RET and ROE were positive (i.e., the Positive/Positive case). However, including firms with a negative slope coefficient on RET (i.e., the Anything/Positive case) substantially reduced the statistical significance of the results.
Finally, our results are limited by the restrictive structural model relating the constructs of interest. Specifically, we assume a simple recursive structure in which PERF MIX is an endogenous variable and NOISE, CORR, GROWTH, and OTHER are exogenous variables. If some of these constructs are endogenous, it would be desirable to develop a more complicated nonrecursive model in order to avoid the bias in the coefficients that results from ignoring the simultaneous equations aspects of the system.
APPENDIX A
Overview of Latent Variable Analysis
In a latent variable analysis, each observed variable, or proxy, is assumed to be composed of the "true score" for its underlying construct and "measurement error." In particular, it is assumed that the observed variables have a common factor analysis structure. For the Positive/ Positive case, this structure can be represented as: where the X; are regression parameters, and the 5^ are "measurement errors" or disturbance terms. The disturbance terms in equation (Al) are assumed to be uncorrelated with the underlying constructs and uncorrelated with each other. Since the CORR construct has only a single variable (i.e., ZTRANS), the relation between CORR and ZTRANS is expressed as an identity.^® Statistical procedures for estimating the relations among the latent variables, such as those implied by the structure imposed by equation (Al), have been developed by Joreskog [1969; 1971; 1978] , Browne [1984] , and Bentler [1983a; 19836] , among others. These procedures exploit the fact that the covariance matrix among the observed variables can be expressed as a function of the parameters X; and var(5;) from equation (Al) and the parameters of the variance-covariance matrix among the latent variables.^® Specifically, let 2) {0) denote the variance-covariance matrix implied by a given set of basic parameters 6 (i.e., the parameters Xi, var(6,), and the parameters of the variance-covariance matrix of the latent variables). Intuitively, the estimation procedure can be thought of as choosing the parameters 9 whose corresponding variance-covariance matrix, X (^)» most closely reproduces the empirical variance-covariance matrix for the observed variables, S. Given the estimates for the variancecovariance matrix for the latent variables, the partial correlation coefficients (and their associated standard errors) between the latent variables, which correspond to the parameters 7, in equation (12), can then be obtained in a straightforward manner.
More formally, the basic parameters 6 are chosen to minimize the fit function:
where s is a (55 X 1) vector of the variances and covariances of the observed variables, and a is the corresponding (55 x 1) vector of variances and covariances implied by the basic parameters 6.'^ The vector (sa{0)) therefore represents the residual variances and covariances of the observed variables (i.e., the portion of the variances and covariances that cannot be explained by the underlying parameters 6). The matrix W determines the weight that each residual variance or covariance receives in selecting the basic parameters 9 to minimize the fit function. The choice of the matrix W depends on the assumptions made about the distributions of the observed variables. For example, if the observed variables are independent and follow a multivariate normal distribution, the weight matrix can be specified so that the estimation procedure provides full information maximum likelihood {FIML) esti-'"' We also constrain the variances of the latent variables to be equal to ojie in order to identify the system (see Long [1976] for a discussion of this issue).
''"For example, the covariance between the variables MR-PP and RTVAR is XiX3 • cov (PERF MIX, NOISE) , and the covariance between the variables BC-PP and RSVAR is X2X4 • cov(PERF MIX, NOISE). As discussed in n. 38, since the variances of the latent variables are constrained to equal one, the covariances among the latent variables are equal to the correlations between the latent variables.
*' ' In particular, s is the lower triangular elements (including the diagonal elements) of the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the observed variables.
mates and standard errors for the coefficients relating the latent variables to other latent variables and for the coefficients relating the latent variables to their observed proxies.*"^ Under these conditions, the FIML estimates are consistent, asymptotically normally distributed, and asymptotically efficient.
To provide some evidence on how well our data satisfy the assumption of multivariate normality, table 7 presents the skewness and kurtosis of each variable used in the cross-sectional analysis. The results indicate that, even after the data have undergone a logarithmic transformation, the assumption of multivariate normality can be rejected (for an overall test of the assumption of multivariate normality, we use the Mardia [1970] test, which is distributed as a standard normal variable in large samples). Multivariate normality is least seriously violated for the Positive/Positive case, followed by the Constrained/Constrained case and the Anything/Positive case. For the proxies for the exogenous constructs, the EQ/COMP and STOCK variables are positively skewed, and the S GROW variable has a more positive kurtosis than would be expected in a normal distribution. For the proxies for the endogenous constructs, the Positive/Positive proxies are closest to satisfying the normality assumption, the An3i;hing/Positive proxies are leptokurtic, and the Constrained/ Constrained proxies are positively skewed.
Bentler [1985, pp. 53-54] reports that "there is little empirical or theoretical guidance available as to when a statistically significant variation from normality becomes large enough to affect structural modeling conclusions." The maximum likelihood parameter estimates are generally robust to violations of normality. However, the standard errors must be interpreted with caution when the variables are not normally distributed. In order to provide some evidence on the appropriateness of the maximum likelihood procedures for our problem, we also conduct the estimation using procedures that allow for distributions that are more general than multivariate normal.
For situations in which the primary violation of normality results from the kurtosis of the variables, Browne [1984] has developed estimation procedures (i.e., the specification of the form of the W marix) based on elliptical distribution theory. In particular, the elliptical distribution estimation procedures are based on the assumption that the variables have a common coefficient of kurtosis. Under these conditions, the resulting elliptical estimators are consistent and asymptotically efficient. The estimation procedure also provides standard errors for the parameter estimates Which allow significance tests to be performed. For our data *" In particular, if the weight matrix is iteratively updated during estimation, minimizing equation (A2) is equivalent to minimizing the function log[det(]S)] + trace[S 2~'] "" log[det(S)] -p, where log is the natural logarithm, det is the determinant of a matrix, trace is the trace of a matrix, and p is the number of observed variables (p = 10 for our model). See Browne [1984, p. 65] results in table 7) , the assumption of equal coefficients of kurtosis is more likely to be met for the Positive/Positive and the Constrained/ Constrained cases than for the Anything/Positive case. In order to provide estimates under even more general assumptions regarding the distributions of the variables, we also estimate the coefficients using unweighted least squares.*^ While the coefficients provided by this method are consistent, they are not asymptotically efficient. One further disadvantage of the unweighted least squares estimation procedure is that the standard errors of the coefficients cannot be directly calculated. Joreskog [1981] suggests that the standard errors can be calculated using jackknifing methods. Therefore, our empirical results present jackknifed standard errors for the coefficients estimated using the unweighted least squares method. It should be noted, however, that jackknifing methods can be sensitive to skewness in the data (see Mosteller and Tukey [1977] ).
APPENDIX B Assessment of the Latent Variable Model
Before the parameter estimates can be interpreted, it is important first to examine how well the estimated model implied by the theory characterizes the data. In particular, it is critical to demonstrate that each proxy measure has a positive and statistically significant relationship with its construct. This examination is done by determining whether each X is positive and has a "large" z-statistic.*^ The results in table 8
"^ In this case, the estimation procedure is equivalent to minimizing (s -a(8)) ''W(s<r(0) ), where W is an identity matrix. This is equivalent to minimizing the sum of the squared covariance residuals.
An alternative estimation procedure is to use the Arbitrary Distribution Function (ADF) estimators developed by Browne [1984] . These estimators impose no distributional restrictions except that the first four moments and the eighth moment of the distributions exist. This procedure is computationally intensive relative to the ones that we employ and sensitive to the starting values provided to the algorithm. The ADF estimators provided results similar to those reported in tables 6 and 8 for the Positive/Positive case. However, we experienced convergence problems in attempting to estimate the parameters of the other two cases. This result may be due to the fact that the relations between the variables appear to be much stronger in the Positive/Positive case than in the other two cases. Moreover, the simulation results in Browne [1984] seem to suggest that the ADF estimates can be biased in small samples. Despite these problems, the distribution-free nature of the ADF estimators may make them attractive in research studies in which multivariate normality is a tenuous assumption.
"' For ease of comparison, the parameters reported in tables 6 and 8 are standardized (i.e., computed as if the latent variables have unit variances and the observed variables also have unit variances). Since the scales for the variables are irrelevant for our purposes, this does not affect the substantive inferences made regarding the research hypotheses. However, the z-statistics reported in the tables are based on the unstandardized solution (because the input into the estimation algorithm is the covariance matrix not the correlation matrix). The covariance matrix is used as tbe input because the mathematical statistics that form the basis of the estimation are developed from knowledge of the distribution of the covariance matrix (e.g., if the data are multivariate normal, the covariance matrix is Wishart distributed). The distribution of the correlation matrix is less obvious. •J e function in equation (A2) for the theoretical model to the value (denoted Qo) of the fit function for a "null model" (i.e., a model where each proxy variable is its own latent variable and each of these latent variables is constrained to be independent). The Bentler and Bonett index is computed as [1 -Q/Qo]-This index can be thought of as providing some indication of how much better the theoretical model fits the data relative to the severely constrained null model. Bentler [1985] suggests that the Bentler and Bonett index should exceed 0.90 in reasonable models. For each of our cases, the Bentler-Bonett index exceeds this suggested "cutoff".
Finally, we also examine the standardized residual covariance (or correlation) matrix, (s ~ a{9)), for large and statistically significant values. Many large residuals are indicative of an inability of the theoretical model to reproduce the observed variance-covariance matrix. Therefore, we report the percentage of standardized residual covariances that are statistically significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). For the Positive/ Positive case, less than 2% of the standardized residual covariances were significant. For the Anything/Positive case, less than 4% were significant, and for the Constrained/Constrained case, less than 6% were significant. Overall, we conclude that our model has a "reasonable" ability to reproduce the observed variance-covariance matrix.
